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Do we always do what others do, and, if not, when and under what conditions do we do so?
In this paper we test the hypothesis that mimicry is moderated by the mere knowledge of
whether the source is a member of the same social category as ourselves.
Methods
We investigated group influence on mimicry using three tasks on a software platform which
interfaces with mobile computing devices to allow the controlled study of collective behav-
iour in an everyday environment.
Results
Overall, participants (N = 965) were influenced by the movements of confederates (repre-
sented as dots on a screen) who belonged to their own category in both purposive and inci-
dental tasks.
Conclusion
Our results are compatible with collective level explanations of social influence premised on
shared social identification. This includes both a heuristic of unintended mimicry (the acts of
group members are diagnostic of how one should act), and communication of affiliation
(based on a desire to make one’s group cohesive). The results are incompatible with tradi-
tional ‘contagion’ accounts which suggest mimicry is automatic and inevitable. The results
have practical implications for designing behavioural interventions which can harness the
power of copying behaviour, for example in emergency evacuations.
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Introduction
When–and why–do we copy the behaviour of others? Such mimicry applies to an extremely
wide range of phenomena from the simplest reactions such as scratching and yawning [1,2] to
more complex activities such as health related behaviours [3] and from the self-evidently pur-
posive–such as food consumption [4]–to the apparently incidental, such as face touching [5],
finger tapping [6], and foot shaking [7].
Mimicry has also been invoked as a key factor in building bonds between individuals [8,9].
Some have gone further and argued that it is the basic building block of all social life [2,10].
The importance of mimicry is evidenced by the number of human sciences that draw upon
this concept, including psychology [11], economics [12], and consumer behaviour [13], but
also in animal research [14].
However, while there is widespread consensus as to the importance of the phenomenon,
there is far less agreement as to the condition(s) under which it occurs. In this paper, we draw
on self-categorisation theory (SCT) [15] in order to test the hypothesis that mimicry is moder-
ated by the mere knowledge of whether others are members of the same social category as
ourselves.
The nature and causes of mimicry
Mimicry is a form of indirect social influence where the source is copied by an interaction
partner without that source directly seeking to exert influence [16]. It is part of a broader set of
copying phenomena, including emulation (which involves copying the results without neces-
sarily using the same exact actions to achieve them) [17] and imitation. Mimicry involves an
interaction partner copying the actual behaviour of the source within a short window of time,
typically no longer than three to five seconds [16]. Mimicry is usually thought of as distinct
from conformity and normative influence, which are associated with an internalisation of
beliefs or attitudes rather than the adoption of a fleeting behaviour [18,19]. Other terms are
often used to denote influence without conscious intent, notably ‘contagion’ [20]. However, in
this paper we avoid the term ‘contagion’ or else use it in quotation marks because of the way it
conflates a description of the phenomenon with a (medicalised) explanation and a (negative)
evaluation. The metaphor of ‘contagion’ suggests that mimicry, like a virus, spreads by mere
proximity alone, regardless of who the carriers are, or the relationships involved.
A number of researchers propose that mimicry is used to communicate about oneself and
is used as a tool to affiliate with other individuals [11,21]. When, in interpersonal contexts we
copy the emotions, facial expressions or gestures of others, we convey understanding and a
sense of togetherness with the other. Accordingly, it has been shown across various studies,
that mimicry increases when participants believe that they are visible to others [6,22] and
when participants have a desire for affiliation with ingroup members [9,23,24] or to appease
outgroup members [25,26]. However, it is possible that mimicry has functions other than com-
munication and affiliation, which would be indicated if it occurred in the absence of a watch-
ing audience. An alternative heuristic approach suggests that we copy others because their
behaviour is likely to be a good guide to how we should behave ourselves [27,28]. In an emer-
gency evacuation, for example, others’ egress behaviour may be the only information available
about appropriate exit routes and will therefore lead to copying. Using a virtual reality experi-
ment in which people had to escape from a room in a museum, Kinateder, Comunale and
Warren showed that using a familiar exit in an emergency evacuation is increased if neigh-
bours do the same [29]. Van den Berg and colleagues used computer gaming to show that the
more people someone sees leaving in a potential emergency, the more inclined this person is
to leave [30]. This is not to say that the use of a mimicry heuristic is always adaptive in terms of
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its outcomes. Virtual reality studies have shown that participants follow the behaviour of com-
puter-generated agents during fire evacuations even if this delayed their own egress [29,31].
On the other hand, as studies of behaviour in emergencies show, we don’t follow everyone
equally [32,33]. There are a range of studies which show that mimicry is more likely when one
has some sort of social bond to the other [7,34]. This is true for behavioural ‘contagion’,
whether of yawning [35], face touching [36] or key-pressing [37]. It is equally true of emotional
‘contagion’ [21,38–40].
The notion of ‘social bond’, however, is somewhat vague in most of these studies. In
some cases, it refers to close interpersonal relationships [35]. In other cases, it refers to a
social categorical relationship whereby the source and the observer are part of a common
social group [39]. Our interest lies particularly in the latter, not least because it is more rele-
vant to large-scale social instances of mimicry where the source and observers may not be
close to each other and may even be strangers. Moreover, drawing on contemporary models
of group process–specifically SCT [15,41]–we aim to examine together the two core dimen-
sions of the mimicry process: first, which others do we mimic; second why do we mimic
others?
A self-categorisation analysis of mimicry
According to SCT, and social identity theory from which it developed [42,43], the human self
is not a unitary construct but rather a multi-dimensional system made up of personal identities
(which define what makes me as an individual distinctive compared to other individuals) and
social identities (which define what makes my group distinctive compared to other groups).
We have multiple social identities, corresponding to the different groups we belong to, which
become salient in different contexts. When any given social identity is salient, it determines
how we see others (notably whether they are ingroup or outgroup) and defines the norms, val-
ues and beliefs through which we see the world. Insofar as ingroup members share in these
understandings we expect to agree with them [44]; we actively seek agreement with them [45];
and, especially on matters of relevance to the group, we see them as a guide to what we should
think and do [46,47].
In terms of mimicry, then, the SCT approach is consistent with the heuristic approach of
Gigerenzer [28] by specifying that we see others as providing diagnostic behaviour as to what
we ourselves should do, but only to the extent that we categorise ourselves with them as fellow
ingroup members. One implication of this is that we may mimic complete strangers as much
or even more than those we know well under conditions where the former are ingroup and the
latter are not. To take a familiar example, at a sports event, I may copy the behaviour of an
unknown other who supports the same team as myself while ignoring my sister or friend if
they were to support the other team.
To date, self-categorisation researchers have devoted considerable efforts to showing that
we are more likely to be influenced by those who are ingroup than those who are outgroup
[47,48]. However, the research has generally been focussed on explicit acts of persuasion. With
the exception of some qualitative illustrations in the context of crowd events [46] no attention
has been paid to the immediate copying of an other’s behaviour in the absence of an explicit
attempt by the source to shape the behaviour of the observer. That is the gap which we aim to
fill with this paper.
The present study
We investigated group influence on mimicry using an innovative software platform—The
Hive—which integrates with mobile computing devices to allow collective behaviour to be
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studied in a controlled environment. In The Hive, physically co-present participants move a
dot around the screen of their phone or tablet. On a shared central display, they can see their
own dot and the dots of all the other participants as well. The display can show images and vid-
eos with the dots superimposed, so that participants can take part in an experimental task by
moving their dot. The experimenter can also change the colour of the dots or make them invis-
ible to participants. The Hive has been used to investigate, for example, how knowledge of
each other’s responses changes individual and collective decisions [49].
In our experiment, participants took part in a number of simple games while divided up
into red or blue groups. We employed techniques for inducing psychological group member-
ship analogous to those used in the minimal group paradigm [50]. That is, participants were
assigned into groups at random, although led to believe that they had been grouped with peo-
ple who had made similar choices to them in a personality quiz or in an art preference task.
Although in each trial participants were sitting next to each other, they did not know who was
in their group; and being anonymous, they were not able to communicate with each other.
After the minimal group assignment, we introduced confederate dots into the display.
Although they appeared as other participants, these dots behaved in a pre-programmed way
according to their colour.
Across three tasks, we investigated whether participants would mimic the behaviour of the
confederate dots in their colour group. In the ‘Maze’ task, the red and blue confederates
moved to targets on different sides of the screen. In the ‘Rather’ task, we asked participants
questions such as ‘would you choose the power of flight or invisibility?’ Participants had to
move to the left side or right side of a box to indicate their magnitude of certainty for one
choice or another. The blue and red confederates always clustered towards a particular choice.
In addition, the red confederates left their dots higher in the box than the blues. Third, in a
“Fidget” task, participants were told to wait inside a circle between questions while red confed-
erates moved their dots around slightly and the blues stayed still.
There are four key elements of these tasks which need highlighting. First, the directions and
distances travelled by the participants’ dots in relation to the confederate dots of a similar or
different colour provides measures of ingroup and outgroup mimicry. Our core prediction is
that, on each of the experimental tasks, participants will mimic the ingroup dots more than the
outgroup dots.
Second, in some cases mimicry can be seen as purposive in the sense of being linked to the
fulfilment of the experimental task (i.e., the ‘maze’ task and the left-right choice on the ‘rather’
task). In other cases mimicry can be seen as incidental in the sense of being irrelevant to the
fulfilment of the experimental task (i.e., the height choice on the ‘rather’ task and the ‘fidget’
task). Overall, then, the range of tasks allows us to see if the effects of shared category member-
ship on mimicry will be limited to either purposive or incidental behaviours, or else relevant to
both. Our hypothesis is that it will be relevant to both.
Third, other than their own dot, participants have no idea which dot is associated with
whom. They don’t know if any given dot represents someone they know well or a complete
stranger. All they know is whether the dot represents an ingroup or an outgroup member. It
follows that any effects of group relations on mimicry cannot be put down to our personal rela-
tions with other group members but merely from the knowledge of our shared group member-
ship with them.
Fourth, participants are also aware that others have no way of knowing which dot is associ-
ated with whom. Consequently, the way they move their dot cannot be used to communicate
anything about themselves as individuals to others. It flows from this that, any effects of group
relations on mimicry, cannot be explained in terms of communicating about oneself or as a
means of securing one’s affiliation with other group members.
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Methods
Participants
The experiment ran as a summer residency in the ‘Who Am I?’ gallery of the Science Museum,
London, as part of their ‘Live Science’ programme. Participants were visitors to the museum
who agreed to take part in a live study entitled ‘How do you behave in a crowd?’. They were
recruited by posters and flyers in the museum, or by experimenters approaching them on the
gallery floor. Participants were not compensated for their time, as their motivation was to
learn about social science. We sought to run participants in groups of 6–8 with ages of 10 and
above. Since this was an opportunity sample with an educational remit, however, we did not
want to turn away willing participants. With these constraints, group sizes varied from 4 to 12,
with a median of 7 (M = 7.58, SD = 1.88).
Across six weeks of our residency, 1139 people participated in our experiment. For the anal-
ysis, we excluded participants under 10 years of age, and participants who did not complete
the task by choice or because of technical error (such as their device losing internet connec-
tion). This left us with 965 participants to analyse. 55% of participants were female, 35% male
and 10% declined to provide their gender, and overall, they had an age range of 10 to 71
(M = 26.33, SD = 13.87).
Procedure
The experiment ideally began once 6–8 participants had been recruited to take part. Some-
times, if the museum was especially quiet or busy, we ran groups as small as 4 or as large as 12.
Participants were told it was a ten-minute experiment investigating ‘how you behave in a
crowd’. Participants were given an information sheet and a consent form to sign. If they were
under 16 their parent or guardian signed a form as agreed by our ethics committees and the
Science Museum. The experiment was reviewed and approved by the UCL Research Ethics
Committee (Project ID Number: 3828/003) and the School of Psychology & Neuroscience Eth-
ics Committee at the University of St Andrews (Approval Code: PS12971).
Participants sat on curved benches surrounding a large LCD display in a cordoned area of
the Science Museum. Using their own mobile device, or a tablet that we supplied, participants
accessed The Hive website. They entered their age and gender and a unique code for the exper-
imental session. After logging on, their device displayed a dot that could be dragged around.
Each participant saw their own dot, and other participants’, moving on the central display (see
Fig 1). An experimenter stood by the central display and welcomed the participants once they
were all logged on to the Hive. Participants were asked several warm-up questions so that they
could familiarise themselves with using The Hive. Participants were assured that all their data
Fig 1. Schematic of experiment set up and minimal group assignment. In each task, confederate dots are shown here with black dots in the middle,
though to participants, they were indistinguishable from their own. The ‘rather’ task used images to illustrate ‘flight’ and ‘invisibility’ which have been
removed here for copyright reasons.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241227.g001
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was stored anonymously and that they could withdraw and request that their data be removed
at any time.
Using one of two minimal group paradigms, participants were next assigned to either a red
or a blue group. In the art paradigm, participants moved their dot to express which of 12 mod-
ern art paintings they preferred. In the personality paradigm, they answered the 10 items from
the Ten Item Personality Measure (TIPI) [51] using an onscreen Likert scale. In both para-
digms, participants’ dots were not visible on the central display, so that they could give their
response privately without being influenced by others. Participants were then told that based
on their responses, we had categorised them individually into either the red or the blue group,
such that they were placed with people who were similar to themselves and in a different
group from those who were dissimilar to them. Participants’ dots then changed colour on their
devices and the central display, and they were asked to move to different sides of the screen
depending on their assigned group.
At this point the experimenter mentioned that ‘other people playing online or elsewhere in
the museum may be taking part in our experiment too’. Either 6 or 10 confederate dots then
appeared onscreen, with an equal number of reds and blues. The confederate dots’ movements
were pre-recorded by the experimenters, but they appeared to the participants as real, live par-
ticipants indistinguishable from those in the museum. Participants then took part in a series of
games and decisions.
Maze task. Participants were told to move into a central yellow circle at the top of the
screen. The task was to move to one of the green circles in the bottom left or right of the screen,
while keeping their dot within one of two dark grey paths. They were told that they could freely
choose which green circle to choose. Red and blue confederates were programmed to move in
opposite directions to either the left or right circle. The maze task had one trial and partici-
pants were given 15 seconds to complete the task.
Rather task. Participants were asked whether they would rather have the superpower of
flight or invisibility, have love or money, be a dragon or own a pet dragon, and be covered in
fur or scales. To give their answer they moved from the top, centre of the screen into a
response box with one option on the left, one on the right, and ‘don’t know’ in the middle. Red
confederate dots tended to cluster higher in the response box than the blue, and the two col-
ours tended to cluster towards different options.
Fidget. Participants were asked to move to a central yellow circle on four occasions to
await the next ‘Would you rather?’ question. In the ten seconds that they waited, the red con-
federates fidgeted within the circle, moving around slightly from side to side. The blue confed-
erate dots remained still. This task was not counterbalanced.
After these experimental tasks, participants took part in a brief selection of other activities
in The Hive that varied during the course of the six-week residency. These tasks were investi-
gating unrelated hypotheses, and so are not reported here. Importantly, they all occurred after
the experimental task, and so could not influence the results. At the end of the experiment,
participants were debriefed and given a short talk about our hypotheses and related findings in
the literature.
Design
Our key independent variable was the dot colour that was randomly assigned to participants.
In addition to this, we varied a number of other factors between participants. For each session,
we manipulated the grouping method, by art preference or personality test. We varied the
number of confederate dots between 6 and 10. And we varied the orientation of the experimen-
tal tasks: for half of the sessions, we mirror reversed the motions of the confederate dots, so
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that they chose different sides on the maze task and inverted their choices on the preference
task.
Results
Overall, participants were influenced by the movements of the confederate dots who were the
same colour as their own. The exception was the ‘Rather’ task: when we asked participants to
express an individual, arbitrary preference, there was no influence from the confederate dots’
movements.
Across our different experiments, we used Bayesian mixed models to quantify the evidence
that a participant’s dot colour affected their behaviour. Mixed models are able to account for
the effect of individual participants being nested in a particular group, and the Bayesian
approach avoids some of the problems associated with null hypothesis testing [52–55]. Each of
our Bayesian mixed models used fixed effects for the participants’ dot colour (red or blue), the
number of confederates (6 or 10), the grouping manipulation used (TIPI personality index or
art preference), the effect of orientation (where relevant), and a random effect for the group.
We used random slopes and random intercepts. We used R (version 3.4.3) and the rstanarm
package [56], employing weakly informative priors that were scaled following the standard
rstanarm procedure. From 4000 simulations, we generated estimates of the posterior distribu-
tions of the model parameter coefficients, which quantify the strength of the evidence that
each experimental condition influenced behaviour.
Below we report the estimates of the differences between experimental conditions, using
the psycho R package [57]. We report the Maximum Probability of Effect (MPE), which is the
probability that the absolute value of the effect has a median greater than zero. In other words,
the MPE directly quantifies the probability that the experimental condition had an effect on
behaviour. The Bayesian approach favours quantifying the strength of evidence in this way,
rather than simply reporting whether or not an (arbitrary) threshold of significance has been
passed. Having said that, researchers generally suggest that an MPE of above 90% or 95% can
be thought of as ‘strong evidence’ [58]. In addition to these Bayesian analyses, we ran frequen-
tist analysis using more conventional mixed models. These produced a corresponding pattern
of results and can be seen in the SI.
Maze task
We looked at which side of the screen the participants moved to by the end of the trial and
coded this as either the blue side (dot side = 0) or the red side (dot side = 1), according to
where the confederate dots had moved. In half of the trials, the blue confederates moved to the
left, on the other half they moved to the right. Our hypothesis, therefore, was that if the partici-
pants had a red dot their dot side score would be more likely to be 1, and a blue dot, 0.
In Fig 2 we averaged the dot side scores for each group of participants, to give a continuous
variable. As can be seen, the dot side score was higher for red dots than blue.
Our Bayesian mixed model analysed individual participants’ dot side, nested in their experi-
mental group. Since our dependent variable was binary in this case, we based the model on a
binomial distribution. For this experiment, we also included a fixed effect of orientation to
account for the fact that the direction that the red and blue confederates travelled was reversed
for half of the experimental groups. For a fuller description of the Bayesian analysis and fre-
quentist mixed models for the maze task (which come to the same conclusion), please see S1–
S3 Tables.
The colour of participants’ dots influenced which side of the maze they chose. The model
estimated that red dots had a 57% chance of going to the same side as the red confederates,
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and the blue dots had a 42% chance (in other words, 58% chose to go to the same side as the
blue confederates). The MPE for this effect of colour was 99.99%, suggesting strong evidence
for the effect seen in Fig 2.
We also found an effect of the orientation condition (MPE = 99.99%). It seems that, overall,
there was a tendency for blue dots to go to the left and red dots to go to the right. The most
obvious interpretation of this result is that immediately prior to the maze trial, the participants
were asked to move to a side of the screen according to their dot colour, and this was always
blue on the left and red on the right. In the maze trial, half of the time blue confederates con-
tinued to move to the left, and half the time they moved to the right (and red vice versa). How-
ever, there was evidence that participants continued to be influenced by this initial spatial
assignment.
Despite this overall bias, we found strong evidence that participants were influenced by the
behaviour of their same-colour confederates. MPEs for the other parameters suggested that
they did not differ from zero. In other words, there was no evidence that the other two
Fig 2. Distribution of participants’ maze choices, split by dot colour. Inset of example trial with confederate dots
identified by arrows showing pre-determined movements.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241227.g002
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experimental conditions–type of grouping, and number of confederates–had an influence on
participants (see SI for all parameter estimates and MPEs).
‘Rather’ task
We analysed the participants’ final horizontal and vertical dot positions separately, to see if
either were influenced by the confederate dot positions of a particular colour. The confederates
clustered in different corners according to their colour on each trial. Data were then mirror
reversed according to counterbalancing, so that the red confederate dots clustered in the top
left of the response box, and blue confederates on the bottom right (as in the example shown
in Fig 3). This allowed us to frame our predictions more simply by saying that if the explicit
element of participants’ choice was influenced by their confederate group members, then the
horizontal position of the blue dots should be greater than the red. If the arbitrary element of
participants’ choice was influenced by their confederate group members, then the red dots
should have higher vertical position than the blues.
As can be seen in Fig 3, there appeared to be no influence of participants’ dot colour on
their vertical or horizontal position. Our Bayesian mixed models for this analysis had the
Fig 3. Example of the final stage of a preference trial. Confederate dots, identified with a dark spot, clustered in corners of the
response box. Density plots show participants’ final vertical (shown left) and horizontal (top) dot positions. The ‘rather’ task
used images to illustrate ‘flight’ and ‘invisibility’ which have been removed here for copyright reasons.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241227.g003
PLOS ONE Self-categorization as a basis of behavioural mimicry: Experiments in The Hive
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241227 October 30, 2020 9 / 17
addition of a random effect for item, since there were four different questions. The models esti-
mated that the effect of colour was essentially at chance levels for the vertical position
(MPE = 59.9%) and the horizontal position (MPE = 52.6%). For a fuller description of the
Bayesian analysis and frequentist mixed models for the rather task (which come to the same
conclusions), please see S4–S9 Tables.
Fidget
We calculated the total distance travelled by the red and the blue dots once they had entered
The Hive circle, for the ten seconds that they waited for the next question to appear in the
‘Rather’ task. The red confederate dots fidgeted during this time, moving around slightly within
the circle, whereas the blue confederate dots did not. We summed the distance travelled by the
participants (excluding the confederates) across four such trials (Fig 4). As we hypothesised,
this distance was greater for the red dots, who travelled roughly 10% farther than the blue.
Fig 4. Distribution of the total distance participants travelled while waiting inside the yellow circle, split by dot colour. Inset
shows an example trial, with confederate dots marked with a spot.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241227.g004
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Our Bayesian mixed model found strong evidence that colour influenced participant dot
movement (MPE = 98%). We also found evidence that grouping manipulation type (personal-
ity or art) influenced movement (MPE = 99.99%). Participants of both colours who believed
that they had been assigned their dot colour on the basis of the personality test moved their
dots more during the pre-‘Rather’ tasks waiting periods. All parameter estimates of our Bayes-
ian mixed models, and the results of a frequentist mixed model showing the same pattern of
significance, are reported in the SI. The grouping manipulation did not interact with partici-
pants’ dot colours. Regardless of these differing overall levels of restlessness, participants were
still influenced by the small fidgeting motions of the dots whose colour they shared. For a fuller
description of the Bayesian analysis and frequentist mixed model analysis for fidgeting (which
come to the same conclusion), please see S10–S12 Tables.
Discussion
This paper reported the results from three tasks in which participants used a new interactive
paradigm to make behavioural choices within virtual collective environments. Participants
each controlled a dot on a shared display and were divided into two colour groups apparently
based on their responses to personality questions or art preferences. Pre-programmed confed-
erate dots moved in specific ways which allowed testing of self-categorization and communica-
tion explanations for behavioural mimicry in both purposive and incidental tasks.
In the ‘Maze’ task participants were more likely to pick the same direction of travel as their
same-coloured confederates, and in the ‘Fidget’ analysis participants travelled further if they
observed same-coloured dots (but not different-coloured dots) moving more. However, in the
‘Rather’ task there was no significant difference in final vertical or horizontal position based
on the movements of same-coloured dots.
In sum, our predictions are upheld in two of the three tasks, covering both purposive
(‘Maze’) and incidental (‘Fidget’) cases. The exception is the ‘Rather’ task where our prediction
that group membership would moderate mimicry was not upheld. In hindsight, perhaps this is
not altogether surprising. SCT does not propose that we are guided by fellow ingroup mem-
bers whatever they do. It makes clear that influence will be limited to matters that are of rele-
vance to the group identity.
In the present context, then, the wording of the ‘Rather’ task makes explicit that this is an
individual preference rather than a group relevant choice (e.g., “Would you rather be a dragon
or have a pet dragon?”–emphasis added) and therefore we would not expect group influence
to apply. Rather than undermining our overall position, then, this lack of mimicry on the
‘Rather’ task serves to refine our hypotheses by adding an additional dimension: mimicry of
any given action will depend both on the source being ingroup and the action not being explic-
itly irrelevant to group identity. This suggests the importance of addressing issues of identity
content alongside issues of source identity in future research on mimicry.
In terms of explaining the source effects on mimicry that we did find for the ‘Maze’ and
‘Fidget’ tasks, these findings further support the argument that such social influence is not pas-
sive and automatic [5,21,39,59–63]. People clearly don’t copy what others do irrespective of
the circumstances. It is worth reiterating certain features of our experimental paradigm that
we described in the introduction. On the one hand, and unlike previous studies which show
that shared group membership impacts mimicry [21,39], participants don’t know who the
other group members are. All they do know of any given dot is its colour which tells them if it
is ingroup or outgroup. It is therefore possible to distinguish effects of shared group member-
ship from effects of interpersonal relationships in our studies and to conclude that the former
alone impacted mimicry.
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On the other hand, and again in distinction from previous studies, other group members
don’t know who the participant is. Participants therefore cannot communicate anything about
themselves (such as their willingness to follow others and to act as a ‘good group member’)
through the way they move their dot. Such communication about the self—and the motives
associated with it (such as bonding with other group members and securing one’s acceptance
by them)—are therefore unlikely as an explanation of our findings. However, it is possible that
participants felt judged through the behaviour of their avatar. Future research could include
post-study interviews to assess the extent to which participants believed they were anonymous
and unobserved.
By contrast, our findings are compatible with a heuristic approach [28], albeit modified to
state that the acts of other group members are diagnostic of how one should act oneself (as
long as these are relevant to one’s group identity). In this way our findings concerning mim-
icry are in line with self-categorisation research on explicit social influence [47,48]. As such,
the results allow us to conceptualize mimicry as more closely related in terms of underlying
process to other social influence phenomena (not only conformity, but also minority influ-
ence, group polarization, and leadership [46]) than previously thought. Given that the study
did not measure internalisation of beliefs or the time in which participants reacted, we can-
not entirely rule out alternative processes of conformity or normative influence, although
these seem unlikely given that the tasks involved the adoption of fleeting behaviours rather
than attitude change. Future research could adapt the paradigm to test these alternative
explanations. Either way, it is clear from our findings that group identification shaped social
influence.
Nonetheless, the nature of our task does not rule out communicational process entirely, nor
does it rule out affiliation motives but, critically, these would need to be conceptualised at a
collective rather than an individual level. That is, while no-one knows that ‘my dot’ is ‘me’,
they do know (by its colour) that it is an ingroup member. So, I can use the movement of the
dot to demonstrate (for instance) that group members hang together and thereby seek to
enhance the overall cohesion of the group.
Altogether, then, the studies reported in this paper provide evidence that we don’t mimic
just anyone; rather mimicry is moderated by the mere fact of whether the source is seen as an
ingroup member or an outgroup member and that this can occur independently of any per-
sonal relations we may have with that person.
In terms of underlying process, our studies rule out conventional explanations in terms of
individual level communication and affiliation motives. They point instead to collective level
explanations. However, whether these processes are epistemic (based on a heuristic that one
should concur with fellow group members) or communicational/affiliation (based on the
desire to make one’s group cohesive) or a mixture of both remains a topic for further investiga-
tion. Since that there was greater mimicry of ingroup than outgroup members, affiliation
through appeasement [25,26] did not seem to be a factor in our study. This makes sense given
that our stimuli were not threatening.
In terms of practical relevance, our findings have important implications for designing
effective behavioural interventions. In contexts such as emergency evacuation, the egress
behaviour of others is sometimes the only information people have about appropriate exits.
Imitation has been observed in egress behaviour previously [29,30,64], but the self-categoriza-
tion basis of such imitation has not been examined before. A self-categorization model of
mimicry, in which people are more likely to follow ingroup than outgroup members, may be
able to account for variations in copying behaviour in emergency contexts [32,33], and thus
inform emergency preparedness planning and strategy in order to maximise public compli-
ance with safety protocols. However, the external validity of the current research is potentially
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limited by its somewhat artificial nature. Fieldwork and simulation research would help to
bridge the gap between the methods used here and practical interventions.
A further limitation of the current design is that due to the seating arrangements partici-
pants could have potentially observed each other’s devices and thus linked dot behaviour to
individuals. Although we think that this possibility was unlikely, future versions of the para-
digm could use dividers or have participants take part in different rooms to prevent any obser-
vation of one another’s behaviour in the tasks. This would also allow for the study of whether
the physical co-presence of other participants had an influence on behaviour. However, given
that the physical co-presence of participants was consistent across conditions in the current
study, we do not believe that either of these alterations would affect the pattern of results.
In conclusion, the current study contributes to a better understanding of the influence of
group membership on mimicry. People do not copy others in a way that is as inevitable and
uncontrolled as is sometimes assumed. And if we understand the categorical conditions under
which people do or don’t copy what others do, then we will see that even (perhaps especially)
in the most extreme circumstances, copying behaviour can be harnessed as an asset rather
than feared as a problem.
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54. Makowski D, Ben-Shachar MS, Chen SHA, Lüdecke D. Indices of Effect Existence and Significance in
the Bayesian Framework. Frontiers in Psychology. 2019; 10(2767). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.
02767 PMID: 31920819
55. Aczel B, Hoekstra R, Gelman A, Wagenmakers E-J, Klugkist IG, Rouder JN, et al. Discussion points for
Bayesian inference. Nature Human Behaviour. 2020:1–3.
56. Team SD. RStan: the R interface to Stan. R package version. 2016; 2(1). http://mc-stan.org/rstan/.
PLOS ONE Self-categorization as a basis of behavioural mimicry: Experiments in The Hive
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241227 October 30, 2020 16 / 17
57. Makowski D. The psycho package: An efficient and publishing-oriented workflow for psychological sci-
ence. Journal of Open Source Software. 2018; 3(22):470. https://doi.org/10.21105/joss.00470.
58. Sorensen T, Vasishth S. Bayesian linear mixed models using Stan: A tutorial for psychologists, lin-
guists, and cognitive scientists. arXiv preprint arXiv:150606201. 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.20982/tqmp.
12.3.p175.
59. Christov-Moore L, Iacoboni M. Self-other resonance, its control and prosocial inclinations: Brain–behav-
ior relationships. Human Brain Mapping. 2016; 37(4):1544–58.
60. Losin EAR, Cross KA, Iacoboni M, Dapretto M. Neural processing of race during imitation: Self-similarity
versus social status. Human brain mapping. 2014; 35(4):1723–39.
61. Hein G, Singer T. I feel how you feel: Neural correlates of empathy in the human brain. Current Opinion
in Neurobiology. 2008; 18:153–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2008.07.012 PMID: 18692571
62. Singer T, Seymour B, O’Doherty JP, Stephan KE, Dolan RJ, Frith CD. Empathic neural responses are
modulated by the perceived fairness of others. Nature. 2006; 439(7075):466–9. https://doi.org/10.1038/
nature04271 PMID: 16421576
63. Leighton J, Bird G, Orsini C, Heyes C. Social attitudes modulate automatic imitation. Journal of Experi-
mental Social Psychology. 2010; 46(6):905–10.
64. Kinateder M, Comunale B, Warren WH. Exit choice in an emergency evacuation scenario is influenced
by exit familiarity and neighbor behavior. Safety science. 2018; 106:170–5.
PLOS ONE Self-categorization as a basis of behavioural mimicry: Experiments in The Hive
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241227 October 30, 2020 17 / 17
